[Reproduced by permission. © Thurgood Marshall Law Review 2002.]

27 Thurgood Marshall Law Review 1


 By Anthony Peirson Xavier Bothwell [1]


This article argues that the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is inherently and unfairly biased against racial minorities.  It further argues that the white-dominated institution that administers the test has been tainted by a history of apparent or actual financial conflicts of interest.  The author concludes that the LSAT should be abolished and that law school admissions should be based on an evaluation of the applicant’s entire background and potential.

            Scores on the Law School Admission Test do not correlate to performance in law school or law practice.  In the final analysis, the scores correlate to the race and socioeconomic background of the test taker.

            The LSAT closes the doors of the legal profession to members of groups already disadvantaged by conditions of contemporary American society.  Mandatory use of the test is as disingenuous as legal devices that disenfranchised Mississippi blacks in the 1950s and German Jews in the 1930s.

            The American Bar Association (ABA), founded in 1878 as a guild dedicated to de jure racist exclusionary practices, continued openly to pursue racist goals until the 1960s.  De facto racist practices of today’s ABA include non-accreditation of law schools that do not require applicants to take the LSAT.  The ABA’s policies prohibit accreditation of a  school that does not use an “acceptable” test of “aptitude.”  ABA officials never have found any test acceptable other than the LSAT, even though the LSAT organization concedes it is not an “aptitude” test, and independent reviews found it biased.

            Authors of the LSAT traditionally have appeared to be insensitive to issues of cultural bias.  They seem obsessed with statistics, oblivious to the qualities that make a good lawyer.  Their test makes no pretense of measuring the vital attributes which cannot be quantified, such as interpersonal skills, passion, perseverance, creativity and conscience.

          By punishing the disenfranchised and failing to reward the dedicated, the LSAT furthers the domination of the legal profession by an Anglo elite, an upperclass preoccupied with the pursuit of material riches and seemingly out of touch with the needs and values of ordinary people.              

            These exclusionary trends are accelerated by the anti-opportunity practices where law school admissions offices often are misguided by an infamous Texas case and California’s rekless anti-Affirmative Action policies.

            The LSAT does not truly serve the purpose of aiding in the selection of qualified law students.  Rather, it lines the pocketbooks of some people in the richest segment of the $2 billion legal education industry; it is a goldmine.

            Ethically questionable relationships long have existed between ABA accreditation organs and the LSAT organization.  Powerful attorneys have served as ABA law school accreditation officials and at the same time as officials of LSAT’s Law School Admissions Council, Inc. (LSAC) and Law School Admissions Services, Inc. (LSAS).

            LSAT officials have taken part in the enforcement of the ABA requirement that law schools use the LSAT.  These relationships also have given LSAT officials a voice in ABA votes on whether to accredit new law schools when reducing the intensity of competition for law school seats would have had a negative impact on LSAC/LSAS revenues.

            Some of them use for-profit bar preparatory courses to supplement their income while responsible for enforcement of ABA rules prohibiting law schools from offering for-credit or required bar preparatory courses.

            An antitrust suit by Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, attacking ABA conflicts of interest, paved the way for a similar suit by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).  Under an antitrust consent decree in the Justice Department case, the ABA has become subject to federal supervision for a ten-year period.  The decree instructed the ABA to end abuses such as autocratic control of its accreditation process, and the all-expense-paid trips abroad for accreditation officials.  It also subjects ABA’s accreditation standards, interpretations and rules to unprecedented public scrutiny.

            Law schools should stop using the LSAT.  More admissions officers should start reading the files of their applicants, talk to those who appear qualified, and make selection decisions based on the whole record including evidence of the intangible qualities that a good lawyer needs.

            Responsible officials should use every available tool to enable the nation’s law schools to end the LSAT scandal.


            Scores on the Law School Admission Test to not correlate to ultimate success in law school or the legal profession.  The do correlate to success on other standardized, multiple-choice achievement tests; and to ethnicity and family income.  High LSAT scores correlate to the kind of advantages that the affluent have been given by American society.

            Temple University President Peter J. Liacoras wrote:

            “It is a statistical fact that not only black, Hispanic and native Americans but other groups whose first or family language is not standard English – our traditional white ethnics – and who are not a product of the ‘elite’ preparatory school system, are outscored on such tests by native-born majority Americans who are.  This has little if anything to do with brains or ability or merit or…who will do best in the profession.” [2]     

            He went on to say, “These ostensibly objective tests are not the easy-to-recognize ‘Minorities Keep Out’ obstacles of the 1900s and 1930s.  But they are just as effective barriers, and they should be exposed as such.” [3]

            Ralph Nader and Allan Nairn wrote:

            “The LSAT has been shown to discriminate systematically against certain groups, and it has not been shown to be performance related – in terms of predicting success in legal practice, or revealing those most likely to meet society’s pressing needs for legal services.  Determining entry to legal education…with this test is a practice hardly based on logic and social justice.” [4]

            The Ralph Nader Report on the Educational Testing Service found that the scores on the LSAT correlate to family income. [5]   Other researchers have documented a direct correlation between law schools’ median LSAT scores and average parental income. [6]

            Professor Lani Guinier of the Harvard Law School wrote in a New York Times op-ed piece that, “within every racial and ethnic group, test scores go up with family income.” [7]   She added that the affluent “can afford coaching” for standardized tests, noting: “Students from wealthy families have other advantages.  They are more likely to have been exposed to books and travel.” [8]

            Guinier explained: 

            “Even so, their higher scores reflect the opportunities they have had, rather than how well they are likely to do in school.  Indeed, a recent Harvard study of graduates…found that students with low SAT scores and blue-collar backgrounds tended to be more successful….  This suggests that a subject’s drive to succeed – along with the opportunity to do so – may be the better indicator of future success than test scores.  ….  Affirmative Action is neither the real problem nor the whole solution.” [9]

            Guinier, who had been President Clinton’s first choice for U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, talked about the LSAT when she addressed the 1997 annual meeting of the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law:

            “It is a test that does not predict success in law school.  It does not predict success in life.  It doesn’t predict success for the bar.  But it certainly doesn’t predict success in law school, even for the first year of law school, which is the one thing it is supposed to.” [10]

            Guinier said the LSAT accurately predicted performance for only 9 percent of first-year students and 15 percent of second-year students.  That means respectively 91 percent and 85 percent of these students’ law school performances “are not explained by performance on the LSAT, and yet we have allowed the LSAT to stand in as a proxy for merit.” [11]

            Guinier pointed out that the LSAT does not measure skills lawyers use.  She asked, “What is the LSAT measuring?  Quick, strategic guessing with less than perfect information,” which puts at a disadvantage women who like to ruminate or research. [12]  

            Professor Gary Palm of the University of Chicago quoted from Guinier’s talk when he addressed fellow members of the Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education at its August 1, 1997 meeting in San Francisco.  Executive Director Philip Shelton of the Law School Admissions Council replied by insisting that LSAT is a predictor of first-year grades. [13]     

            The Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund has said:

            “Designed to indicate a candidate’s competency to study law, the LSAT has become, intentionally or not, an exclusionary device which has a disproportionate impact on the disadvantaged and on racial/ethnic minorities.” [14]

Severe Limitations

            A study by the LSAT organization itself reported, “Not surprisingly…admissions directors at many schools have found that, for the great majority of their students, grades and LSAT scores are not very closely related to actual first-year performance.” [15]

            The LSAT has been described aptly as a standardized, multiple-choice, “purported” aptitude test. [16]

            It is clear that LSAT scores have “a more detrimental exclusionary effect” on minorities than undergraduate grade point averages. [17]  

            The LSAT was started by the Educational Testing Service (ETS) at the request of Harvard, Yale and Columbia law schools in 1948.  The Law School Admission Council was formed in 1968 because ETS wanted to contract with one organization instead of having to deal with many law schools.  

            LSAT scores reflect achievement, not aptitude.  Officials of LSAC, administering the LSAT, have conceded that it is an achievement test, not an aptitude test. [18]

            LSAC and Law School Admission Services (LSAS), defendants in an antitrust suit filed by Massachusetts School of Law, conceded during discovery that the LSAT is not an aptitude test. [19]

            Even the LSAT’s most ardent advocates concede that it does not predict academic success beyond the first year of legal studies, when many law students have “caught on” to the techniques of law school exam writing.  In fact, the test has little or no relationship to performance even in the first year of law study.  Critics say the LSAT is so “inept” that it undergoes constant changes in the kinds of questions as well as the scoring scale, in what has been seen as a futile effort to cure its many shortcomings. [20]

            Peter Winograd, the LSAT director for ETS and later for LSAC, conceded that even the test’s putative validity as a predictor of first-year performance is no better than the flip of a coin. [21]   

            Lizabeth A. Moody has led the LSAT organization while also serving as an official of the ABA panel that requires law schools to use the LSAT.  Moody insist that “what the LSAT is solely designed to do is to predict first-year grades, and there is a significant correlation.” [22]   Reached by telephone at her office at St. Petersburg, Fla., she said that, “like anything else, it’s not a perfect predictor…; if people do better than predicted, then it wasn’t a good predictor for them.” [23]

            Moody’s matter-of-fact observation is, of course, small consolation to those who would have done better than predicted but were denied admission to law school.  Perhaps a legitimate question for further inquiry whether the goal of predicting solely first-year success might have been invented after the data started coming in, rather than before the test was designed.

            Miami Beach City Manager Jose Ramon Garcia-Pedrosa, a member of the ABA Council of Legal Education, said that “the correlation, from everything I’be ever understood, is not as strong between the LSAT and performance as it is between the grade point average and performance.” [24]  

            Former LSAC/LSAS Chief Executive Frederick M. Hart said the LSAT is useful but has “severe limitations.”  He explained that “even the higher correlations at some of the schools are probably not much better than .6,” with the result that “you end up with roughly 36 percent of the variance that goes into making a good student.  …[I]t does have…fairly limited predictive power, the same as the undergraduate grade point average.  And certainly to admit people solely on the LSAT and the undergraduate grade point average is not a decent system.  There arfe a lot more things that go into a law student.” [25]

Bar Passage Rates

            For graduates of most law schools, there is a correlation between the LSAT and the bar exam scores.  However, this correlation is not so strong at law schools that make an effort to help minority and other disadvantaged students through programs such as legal writing tutorials. 

            Massachusetts School of Law reports that its students are drawn from “the very groups…disadvantaged by standardized, multiple choice, objective tests,” yet its graduates generally have done about as well on the Massachusetts bar exam as ABA school graduates who had higher LSAT scores. [26]             

            John F. Kennedy University School of Law graduates, who generally pass the bar exam at respected rates by California standards, showed no consistent correlation between LSAT scores and bar passage rates. [27]          

            Peter Winograd, godfather of the LSAT, said the test is “not perfect” and has “real limitations.” [28]   Law schools having a “narrow range” of LSAT scores show less correlation between scores and grades, he said; but “lots of people with excellent LSAT scores…do not do terribly well, and I’ve seen people with miserable LSATs who surprise you.” [29]

‘Untenable’ Rationale

            The LSAT and other standardized tests have taken control of the hopes, dreams, self-esteem and future of many students.  And yet, according to ETS figures, a roll of the dice would have been as good a predictor of performance as the LSAT nine out of ten times.  ETS data showed the LSAT was only 5 percent accurate in predicting who would graduate from law school. [30]   Lani Guinier’s study, discussed above, suggests little progress has been made in the last 20 years.  The LSAT’s reliability is considerably less than that of the notoriously unreliable polygraph.

            Summarizing the Ralph Nader Report, Allan Nairn addressed the meaning of bias in the LSAT and other standardized tests:

            “The ETS claim that its tests are not biased against minorities is based on a definition that assumes a test is not biased if it predicts first-year grades of minorities about as accurately as it predicts first-year grades of whites.  (This definition was developed by ETS researcher T. Anne Cleary.)  This definition ignores the fact that since the validity of grade prediction is low for both whites and minorities, and minorities tend to receive lower scores, they can be excluded by a test score that has little connection to their actual ability to succeed. [31]                 

            This flaw in the Cleary rationale was recognized by Richard. Levine, ETS Vice President for Statistical Analysis, who called it “untenable” in a Sept. 24, 1971 memorandum.  The Nader report lamented the fact that the fallacious Cleary defense still was used by ETS officials as late as 1980. [32]   It still is heard in some circles today. 

            Analogously, a University of California study by Roy D. Goldman and Melvin Widawski showed that the addition of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) to high school grades did little to increase admission of students who succeeded in college, but resulted in admission of far fewer African American and Latino students. [33]   The same phenomenon is associated with increased reliance on LSAT scores in law school admissions, as studies by Guinier and Wightman respectively have shown.   

            As the American Pre-Law Advisor reported, the LSAT uses long, boring passages with hard questions and close, arbitrary answers to test reading comprehension; short passages and tangled questions with mystifying answers to test logical reasoning; and analytical reasoning questions which, when they can be deciphered, allow selection of a correct answer.  Most LSAT questions allow only for a “best” answer, which often is not a very good answer. [34]          

            The fatal flaw in the LSAT is that it does not measure qualities that make a good lawyer.  A sample LSAT analytical reasoning question reads as follows:

            “A small software firm has for offices, numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4.  Each of its offices has exactly one computer and exactly one printer.  Each of these eight machines was bought in either 1987, 1988, or 1989.  The eight machines were bought in a manner consistent with the following conditions:

            “The computer in each office was bought either in an earlier year than or the same year as the printer in that office.

            “The computer in office 2 and the printer in office 1 were bought in the same year.

            “The computer in office 3 and the printer in office 4 were bought in the same year.

“The computer in office 2 and the computer in office 3 were bought in different were bought in different years.

“The computer in office 1 and the printer in office 3 were bought in 1988.


“Suppose the computer in office 2 and the computer in office 3 had been bought in the same year as each other.  If all the other conditions remained the same, then which one of the following machines would have been bought in 1989?

“( A ) the printer in office 1

“( B ) the computer in office 2

“( C ) the printer in office 2

“( D ) the computer in office 4

“( E ) the printer in office 4.” [35]           

That question about which machine would have been purchased in a certain year does not test skills having any relevance to legal scholarship or advocacy.  It is illustrative of the fact that the LSAT excludes applicants on the basis of attributes that ought to have nothing to do with determining admission to law school.

The Other Skills 

            The LSAT-dominated, numbers-driven law school admissions process overlooks factors that are critical to successful performance in the study and practice of law.  It essentially ignores such factors as: a person’s diligence; ability to speak and write effectively; ability to get along with people; basic intelligence; creativity, personality and honesty.  No weight is given in the LSAT numbers to wisdom, humility, appreciation of poetry or commitment to higher values.  The test does not address the candidate’s ability to read people, sense of mission, listening skills, intuition or self-confidence.  It does not measure historical insight, interest in research, negotiation skills, the ability to be a team player, coping skills, vision, moral sense or desire to be of service to the community. 

            The LSAT cannot quantify “integrity; it doesn’t measure perseverance,” said Temple University President Peter Liacouras.  He added that the LSAT also “doesn’t measure any of the items that it takes to be a good lawyer except syntactical skills: if A or B, then C; if A and B, then D.  Well, logical skills are fine but the other skills are really what separates a good lawyer from somebody else.” [36]   No objective test can quantify, by any consistent standard, the intangibles that matter most in the formation of the kind oif lawyers that people need in today’s society.


            Dean Colin S. Diver of the University of Pennsylvania Law School urged the ABA to abandon its Standard 503, which effectively mandates law school use of the LSAT.  The accreditation standard “could make it difficult, if not impossible, for a law school to dispense with the LSAT as a device for evaluating applicants,” he noted.  Diver pointed out, “Standardized tests have come under severe criticism, and the accreditation standards should encourage, rather than discourage, innovation and experimentation in finding evaluation instruments.” [37]





Societal Disaster


Bernard Ashe, a member of the ABA Accreditation Committee, said, “The LSAT, as far as I am concerned, only provides an indicator of the potential for success….  I don’t know that it’s a fair indicator of how someone would do in law school or…on the bar exam.” [38]   Interviewed at the ABA 1997 Annual Meeting, Ashe explained:


            “There are those who are good test takers…who usually do better than those who draw blanks with those types of examinations.  ….  Well, standardized tests are generally prepared by ‘experts in the field.’  Most of them are usually in the mainstream of our population.” [39]   Ashe, who is African American, told the author, who is Anglo: “Their experiences would not lead them to be sensitive to issues of cultural bias necessarily.” [40]


            Laura S. Bennett, a testing expert, has shown the fallacy in the common notion “that standardized tests are ‘objective.’”  She wrote “the only thing objective about them is that they are scored by machines.  Everything else, from the selection of the test format to the wording of questions and answers is subjective and reflects the background and biases of the test developer.” [41]   Jose Garcia-Pedrosa was literally correct when he said, regarding ABA’s requirement of a law school admissions instrument, “All the ABA requires is that…the LSAT or some other test be validated, be shown to have a correlation.” [42]            


            The ABA standard says a law school that does not use the LSAT must show that it uses an “acceptable” test.  In practice, however, the ABA never has found an alternative test to be acceptable.  Therefore we logically may refer to the ABA requirement as an LSAT mandate because that has been its meaning in practice.  The ABA’s de facto policy of forcing the use of the LSAT to select applicants has been called a “societal disaster.”  It cuts off the chance for many promising women and men who come from and often would be best equipped to represent minorities, immigrants, the sociologically disadvantaged.  The LSAT has the effect of keeping many capable individuals from lower and middle income groups, and people in mid-life ready for a new career, from entering law school. [43]   


Significant Waste


            The LSAT has injured those, “often from less privileged goups, whose backgrounds caused them to be unfamiliar with concepts used on the test,” as Massachusetts School of Law advised the U.S. Department of Education.  The test “injured those who had the unusual witr to see that convoluted, peculiarly worded questions which the testmakers thought susceptible to only one answer – their answer – could be better answered in some other way.”  Thus it has locked the law school doors to many who, if allowed in, “would have been fine lawyers.” [44]


            South Carolina-born Henry Ramsey, Jr., retired California judge and ex-Howard law dean, has been a high official of both the ABA and LSAC and a stout defender of the status quo.  But he conceded gthat the present system is heavily weighted against minority group members.  Ramsey said that to “devote substantial resources and dedicate three years of one’s life to the study of law, with little likelihood of passing the bar…would, in most instances, be a significant waste….  [T]he point is…of special significance to minority groups….” [45]   Ramsey’s would seem to be a sadly defeatist view.


            LSAT loyalist Winograd says the problem is not bias in the LSAT but the fact that some schools treated minorities “flexibly” prior to Hopwood v. Texas, [46] which killed Affirmative Action at the University of Texas School of Law.  Winograd’s home state of New Mexico, land of today’s descendants of ancient tribes, conquistadores and pioneers, may lay claim to some of the best race relations in the United States.  Thinking about the Hopwood problem, he suggested a remedy could be to treat all applicants “flexibly,” – actually to “read the personal statements…consider the employment and the extracurricular activities and the hurdles overcome and all of that.”  That, he said, is what University of New Mexico admissions officers do for in-state applicants to their law school. [47]  


            Dean Lizabeth Anne Moody of Stetson University School of Law, a prominent official of both LSAC and ABA, was asked whether there are any cultural biases in the LSAT.  She replied: “Uh, cultural bias in the LSAT – uh, all of the studies show that there is no cultural bias.”  Asked whether minorities tend to obtain lower scores on the test, Moody answered, “It’s hard to say.  There is, uh, uh, uh, some problem.”  Moody was named to the LSAS Board of Trustees in 1988, and served as LSAC Executive Director from 1991 to 1993. [48]    




In his last debate with Stephan A. Douglas, Abraham Lincoln said: “It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself.  It is the same spirit that says, ‘You work and toil and earn bread and I’ll eat it.’  [Loud applause.]  No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.” [49]  


            A century ago, many American-born Protestant lawyers shared more than their Anglo-Saxon legal heritage, common cultural experience and white skin.  They also shared an assumption that assured them of their own supremacy – the belief that non-whites and non-Protestants were inferior.  There still are many in the bar today who assume, suspect or subconsciously want to believe that those of a different color, creed or country of origin are unworthy to practice law.  Many Anglos are satisfied with the simplistic, unsubstantiated theory that African Americans and Latinos do not generally score as well on the LSAT because they are not qualified to go to law school.  Too many who accept this view are blind to their own bigotry, chained in the cell of closed-mindedness.  They avoid their own cognitive dissonance by repressing evidence contrary to old, assumed biases.  They shut out the truth that the disenfranchised in our society can compete when the playing field is made level, the crooked places straight.


            A lower-income African American student may not be able to afford an LSAT preparatory course to find keys to testmanship and tricky questions.  However, given the spark of passion, the gift of eloquence, the drive to learn, and then a seat in a law school whose faculty would compensate for past deprivation, you will see her standing tall in court.  It is blind bigotry, not deprivation, that manifests true ignorance.


Historical Evidence


            The ABA requirement that law schools use the LSAT, which achieves racist discrimination by de facto means, perpetuates what used to be the ABA’s avowed purpose of excluding minorities from the legal profession.  From the time of its birth in 1879, the ABA was dedicated to keeping out blacks, immigrants and others deemed unworthy. [50]   From the time when the ABA Section of Legal Education was formed in 1893, [51] the ABA’s primitive racism permeated its elitist education program.


            When the ABA discovered that it inadvertently had admitted three African American attorneys to membership in 1912, it rescinded the action in a resolution that affirmed “the settled practice of the Association has been to elect only white men as members.”  The membership chairman commented then that it was “a question of keeping pure the Anglo-Saxon race.”  The ABA remained openly committed to the sick ideal of lily-white membership until the nineteen-sixties, [52] when King and Kennedy – and Cheney, Schwerner, Goodman, Liuzzo, Evers and others – awakened the conscience of white America to the injustice of race hate.


            Temple’s President Liacouras wrote that historically the ABA “objective was to keep out the Jews, Southern and Eastern Europeans, and Catholics who [allegedly] would dilute or undoubtedly deteriorate the high standards, order, congeniality and ethics in the legal establishment.” [53]  


            Walter George Smith, who was to become one of the early presidents of the xenophobic ABA, said he saw “difficulties in maintaining the standards of the profession if it opened its gates to certain immigrants.” [54]   As Philadelphia attorney Henry F. Drinker said approvingly at the time, one of the goals of the ABA was to keep out minorities, “:especially Russian Jew boys.” [55]   Jerold Auerbach wrote that the early objective of the bar association in Pennsylvania, “as one lawyer expressed it, was to keep the bar ‘clear and clean.’  The primary source of difficulty, explained another attorney, was with those who entered the profession ‘with a background of the ideas of continental Europe.’  James Beck, former solicitor general of the United States and an ethnocentrist, wrote: ‘[I]f the old American stock can be organized, we can still avert the threatened decay of constitutionalism in this country.’” [56]       


            When the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) was formed a century ago, it excluded night schools – because they served hard-working immigrants who wanted a chance to enter the profession that had been denied them. [57]   The bigotry of the era was heard in the voice of Dean Harry S. Richards of the University of Wisconsin, who warned that “night schools enrolled a very large proportion of foreign names,” adding, “emigrants [sic] covet the title of attorney as a badge of distinction.  The result is a host of shrewd young men…viewing the Code of Ethics with uncomprehending eyes.” [58]            


Hypocritical Standard


            The ABA has continued to assert an accreditation standard that prohibits law schools from enrolling students who work more than 20 hours per week.  In practice, some ABA schools have been said to let favored students work more than the 20-hour limit, while the hypocritical standard continues to tell members of disadvantaged groups tghat they need not apply.  Liacouras said the ABA thus sends “a message that we don’t want people in the school who are honest and who are going to have to work their way through.  They have to wink and jive and juke around.”  He said this is not an appropriate way for ABA and its schools to be “teaching ethics,” by bad example. [59]  


            The Temple University president said the ABA rule on student work hours is “a perpetuation of that kind of indignity” which immigrants faced more than 100 years ago.  He recalled that “the ethnics could not get in and they had to create night schools for them and keep them out if they had to work more than twenty, let them go at night; they’re not worthy.” [60]


            Asked to identify the root cause of low minority scores, the LSAT’s long-time defender Peter Winograd said:  “Oh, a whole lot of things.  Uh, education, uh, if you look at the public schools in this country, what goes on in a lot of those places, uh, who populates for the most part the New York City schools and the Washington, D.C. schools, it’s heavily minority, and…what kind of stimuli are being provided in the home, uh, and, of course, there’s a correlation with income and all of that.” [61]   


            Race hate and blatant elitism are no longer so often to be seen and heard.  It is the new era of subtle, slick racism.  More than a century after the birth of the ABA, inequality and injustice prevail in the profession whose mission is equality and justice.  Still after a century, legal education is beyond the reach of most people who come from the groups within our society that are most in need of legal representation.  More than a century after Reconstruction, Uncle Tom no longer lives in the master’s house, and he is no longer thought to be a slave, and the master is no longer said to be a master.  And, more than a third of a century after the advances of the civil rights movement, courts declare that remedies are wrongs, barriers reappear, some law school classrooms turn again lily-white.


            In the dawn of the Third Millennium, we would like to believe what the glossy institutional brochures and the smooth-talking lawyer-politicians say, that everything is fine, that there is no more discrimination, that everybody has an equal opportunity, and tghat success goes toi the deserving.  But underlying it all are some disconcerting realities – for our heritage shapoes us all.  Old prejudices are woven= in the fabric of innocuous-sounding “standards” still in force.  Old biases persist, are institutionalized and camouflaged, invisible barriers pressed tightly to ceilings of glass.


            The status quo is defended by a coalition of the blind and those who refuse to see.




The poet John Donne reminds us:  “…and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.” [62]  


            The exclusivist system of law school admissions perpetuates a profession dominated by the Anglo elite.  It protects and enhances the enrichment of the few.  It deepens the divide between the bar and those it is supposed to serve. 


            The LSAT has contributed to the increasingly elitist character of law schools [63] and hence of the legal profession.  Robert Stevens wrote that mounting research data showed that law students “do not mirror, in socio-economic, racial, or religious terms the society from which they are drawn and for which they are trained. [64]   The current system tends to populate the legal profession with disproportionate numbers of preparatory school graduates whose passion is the pocketbook and who are quite out of touch with the aspirations and afflictions of the ordinary people who need them most.  Scandals wrought by lawyers have defined the history of our era, from Watergate (White House lawlessness in the 1970s) to Stargate (prosecutorial abuses in the 1990s).  And every citizen can recite some sorry anecdote about a lawyer who knew how to count but failed the test of ethical duty.


            A new way is needed to select those who will enter the profession.  New blood, not merely more of the same, will be needed to redeem the honor of the bar in the future.  Before the inception of the ABA, the typical practitioner of law was, like Abraham Lincoln, a circuit-riding advocate, no cog in a big firm, nor part of a high-powered association. [65]   Lincoln would have made great sardonic mirth of the politics of the modern ABA and the mind-game questions of the LSAT.     


            Today there is an overabundance of lawyers who proved they were good at standardized multiple-choice tests of, by and for affluent Anglo sophisticates.  There is a shortage of lawyers of every race, faith and origin who have the positive human attributes such as integrity, resoluteness and caring for others – qualities unmeasured by a computer. 




The late U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy wrote in the context of another time, “They are protesting the failure of our legal system to be responsive to the legitimate grievances of our citizens.  They are protesting because the very procedures supposed to make the law work justly have been perverted into obstructions that keep it from working at all.” [66]         


            When the law itself is turned upside down to block equal admission to the legal profession, it is time to protest.


            The destruction of Affirmative Action in the famed University of California (UC) and University of Texas (UT) law schools triggered a backward movement toward pre-civil rights era conditions in law classrooms.  The big public law schools in California and Texas initially responded to anti-Affirmative Action rulings by allowing LSAT scores to become even more controlling in the admissions process than ever before.


            The abolition of Affirmative Action at UC had an immediate impact.  Only 14 African Americans were among the 792 students accepted to UC Boalt Hall’s 1997 incoming class at Berkeley. [67]   All 14 turned down the offer, [68] preferring to attend law schools where they would feel more welcome.  Many Anglo law students also have been distressed over the increasingly vapid learning atmosphere where racial diversity has been in rapid decompression.  In a round of 791 admissions to the University of Texas Law School 1997 incoming class, only 5 went to African Americans and only 18 to Mexican Americans. [69]   All five of the black students said no thanks. [70]   When UT offered admission to another five African Americans, they also declined. [71]   African Americans, Latinos and Native Americans comprise 9.4 percent of students admitted to UC’s three law schools in 2000, down from 18.4 percent in 1996, the last year of Affirmative Action. [72]   As Anthony Lewis wrote when the new trend emerged, “Those figures should worry all of us: whites and blacks, liberals and conservatives.  For we all live in the same country, and it will be a worse country – more divided, angrier, less committed to hope – if we turn the great American universities back to almost all-white student bodies.” [73]          


            Rodney Ellis, a powerful Texas state senator – the African American son of a maid and a yardman – never would have gone to law school if it had not been for Affirmative Action at the University of Texas.  He said of the new debacle:  “Never in my wildest dreams would I have believed the clock could be rolled back that far that quick.  I remember reading the great civil rights cases in law school, most of them anti-civil rights, and thinking how you can make a cogent argument for damn near anything, and here we go again, with intelligent men in black robes using the words of Martin Luther King to roll back the clock again.” [74]


            Public law schools such as UC and UT have a special obligation to act affirmatively to ensure that they admit and serve people from all segments of the multicultural community. [75]   This is an issue of critical urgency in the giant states of Texas, which is about 40 percent minority, and California, in which all racial groups now are minorities.  The Golden State, where more than one-tenth of all Americans live, is the first big state where non-Hispanic whites are a statistical minority.


            The recent California and Texas experience confirms the conclusions of Linda F. Wightman’s highly respected study of “numbers only” admissions.  She foresaw dire consequences if law schools make admission decisions solely on the basis of LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point averages (UGPA).  Wightman wrote that “the data presented in this study provide bleak prospects for continued ethnic diversity in legal education if admission decisions depend on…LSAT scores and UPGA….  The inappropriateness of relying on these two quantitative indicators of acquired academic skills…results…in systematic and discriminatory selection in our nation’s law schools….  Neither LSAC, as the developer of the LSAT, nor the law schools, as users of the scores and gatekeepers of the profession, should tolerate such abuse.” [76]                 


Noting that “minority groups tend to score lower on the LSAT,” Professor Hart of the University of New Mexico said of the anti-Affirmative Action movement: “It’s very unfortunate and unfair, I think.” [77]   He estimated that it could take minority groups “50 to 75 years” to achieve parity with Anglos in LSAT scores – and that it “may well be” that the LSAT will cease to exist. [78]   Even before the reversals that have afflicted Affirmative Action programs, the LSAT had become “dominant” in law school admissions.  The test was said to “relieve” legal educators of the hard work they otherwise would have to perform in making admission decisions. [79]            

Policies That Preclude


            ABA Standard 211 says law schools “shall not use admissions policies that preclude a diverse student body in terms of race, color, religion, national origin or sex….”  Yet the admission policies of law schools that abandon Affirmative Action policies and allow LSAT numbers to rule tend to preclude a student body diverse, at least in terms of race, color and country of origin.


            At UC Boalt Hall, for example, applicants with undergraduate grade point averages of at least 3.75 had an 89 percent admission rate with LSAT scores of 168-173, but only 45 percent with scores of 162-167. [80]   In Hopwood v. Texas, [81] in which the U.S.  Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down the Affirmative Action program at UT Law School, the court ruled narrowly and did not provide definitive guidance on the subject of law school admissions.  Anthony Lewis said of Hopwood:  “The promise of that rigid rule is that universities should admit students only on ‘merit,’ meaning test scores.  But no good university does that.  Each considers what the applicant is and may be: the obstacles she has overcome, her potential for growth, her skill at sport and music and other things.” [82]   


            According to the law of the land as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was violated when a standardized test, not significantly related to job performance, was required as a condition of employment or job transfer and effectively disqualified African Americans at a higher rate than whites. [83]   The LSAT, not significantly related to performance in law school or law practice, violates the civil rights of disadvantaged minorities. 


            The University of California Board of Regents on July 25, 1995 adopted Resolution SP-1, terminating Affirmative Action policies in admissions and hiring in the state university system.  In a separate but equally misguided development, California voters in November 1996 approved Proposition 209, trashing Affirmative Action policies of the state.  Both SP-1 and Proposition 209 are inconsistent with an enlightened reading of the U.S. Constitution.  The reasoning of their proponents that the remedy is the wrong even fails the test of rationality.


The UC Board of Regents on May 16, 2001 voted unanimously to rescind SP-1, effectively sending a “message” to students of color that “the University of California values them and their education.” [84]   The reversal of SP-1 was regarded as “a symbolic gesture” because Proposition 209 still outlaws Affirmative Action in California state institutions including the public university system. [85]  


            The anti-Affirmative Action measures should have been awarded the same fate as California Proposition 14, a 1964 anti-Equal Housing initiative that was held to violate equal protection.  Proposition amounted to “a new policy of governmental neutrality” in housing, “replacing a former policy of nondiscrimination,” Justice Byron R. White wrote for the U.S. Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey. [86]   The new state policy had the unconstitutional “effect of lending encouragement to those who wish to discriminate.” [87]     


            This author believes that California’s anti-civil rights policies offend not only Fourteenth Amendment due process but also the Thirteenth Amendment.  It was the Thirteenth Amendment which ratified Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and which has been held, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., [88] to prohibit “badges and incidents,” “budens and disabilities” of slavery, “restraints on fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom.” [89]   Thus the Thirteenth Amendment was enforced when discrimination was disallowed in the sale or rental of property. [90]   The author believes the Thirteenth Amendment should be enforced by prohibiting race discrimination in law school admissions.  “Ultimately, Proposition 209 will not be upheld,” [91] Bernard Ashe said, expressing his own opinion about the eventual outcome.




Mike Royko, an insightful observer of institutional scandals, once wrote:  “The other scandal was more interesting because it was something new, and that in itself was unusual.  In Chicago, most scandals repeat themselves.  If a government agency gets in trouble and a reform is instituted, a few years later they wilkl be back in business again.” [92]                      


Legal education in the United States is a $2 billion industry, [93] of which the LSAT is a multimillion-dollar segment.  The Law School Admission Council takes in more than $40 million a year from students who sign up for the Law School Admission Test. [94]   By 1991 there were approximately 94,000 applicants competing for 44,000 seats in U.S. law schools. [95]   The LSAT grew into a cash cow.  LSAT overseer Lizabeth Anne Moody calls the Law School Admission Test the “Cadillac” of standardized tests. [96]  


            Among the Big Three in legal education, LSAC/LSAS is the one that has more discretionary funds than the ABA and the AALS.  Professor Gary Palm of the ABA Council of Legal Education said of LSAC, “We [ABA] don’t have that much money….  Look at their annual report.  They [LSAC] really don’t have that much in expenditures…and they charge for everything!” [97]


            The commercial bar review courses were estimated to be a $60 million industry in 1994. [98]   Law school administration itself can be an enriching enterprise.  The highest paid law school dean, was earning $225,000, plus $56,000 in fringe benefits, according to a 1995 report. [99]


            The U.S. Department of Justice, defending the antitrust judgment and consent entered in United States v. American Bar Association (US v. ABA), [100] stated that ABA accreditation was in need of “reforms to remedy the capture of the process by a small, permanent group of accreditation insiders.” [101]  


            Defendants in Massachusetts School of Law v. American Bar Association (MSL v. ABA), which was filed in 1993, included Law School Admission Services, Inc. (LSAS), a Delaware corporation, and the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), a New York corporation – both based in Newtown, Pennsylvania.  The suit by the Massachusetts law school laid the groundwork for the subsequent civil prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice.  The LSAS and LSAC make millions of dollars every year from the Law School Admission Test.


            According to records obtained form the Delaware Secretary of State, LSAS was incorporated June 8, 1979, and its Board of Directors voted in a special meeting on June 4, 1994 to change the name to Law School Admission Council, Inc. [102]   According to a letter from the New York Secretary of State, LSAC does not exist as a separate entity under New York incorporation laws. [103]  


            Another defendant in MSL v. ABA was the American Association of Law Schools (AALS), a corporation having its offices in Washington, D.C.  As an association of most ABA law schools, AALS participates in all phases of ABA accreditation inspections. [104]           


            The ABA itself is an economic powerhouse.  It has some 75 employees, offers about 100 courses of study, and has distributed more than 1.5 million copies of its books. [105]   It is the world’s largest professional organization. [106]   Pursuant to the consent decree in the suit brought by the government, the ABA disclosed:  Funding for the ABA accreditation process totaled $1,176,000 in the 1994-95 fiscal year.  The ABA Consultant on Legal Education, James P. White, had a staff of 11.  He also had some 200 site evaluation team members, ten of whom conducted 38 percent of the law school evaluations. [107]   For years, White has appointed the members of Accreditation Committee [108] and the members of the site inspection teams. [109]   In an affidavit, White stated that he is “compensated solely by ABA” for his accreditation work. [110]  


            Because the ABA is the “extreme,” the epitome of a “gatekeeper of the guild,” there is “certainly the potential for some very self-serving aspects that go far beyond any other field,” said Dr. George A. Pruitt, a member of the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity, a U.S. Department of Education panel. [111]   Expressing concern about “a direct financial benefit to the practitioners in gthe field for the enforcement of the standards,” Dr. Pruitt went on to say:  “I have never seen a group, an accrediting body, where there is such a lack of public accountability.” [112]   He added that he was “concerned about the inability to have different points of view in such a tightly controlled and what appears to be a self-serving cartel.” [113]  


Wild Attempt to Take Over


            The Education Department’s National Advisory Committee was told in November 1996 that “special interests…have gotten on the Council” of the ABA Section of Legal Education. [114]   The majority of the attorneys on the ABA Council apparently believe they have more important interests to address than the needs of ordinary clients and the rights of the deprived.  Proposals to add “serving the client, instrfuction in lawyering skills, and knowledge about the legal rights and needs of the poor” to legal education standards have been rejected repeatedly by the Council. [115]   The LSAC/LSAS officials who have been responsible for running the Law School Admission Test perform a quasi-governmental function.  They are the border patrol of the legal profession.  After all, most states refuse to allow candidates to sit for the bar examination unless they have graduated from a law school approved by ABA, i.e., one where the LSAT is a prerequisite.


            There may be reason to suspect that some LSAC/LSAS officials have seemed more interested in making money than in devotion to their quasi-governmental duties.  When Adam Robinson and John Katzman went to LSAC/LSAS headquarters to get data they could use in their book, the Princeton Review on the LSAT, they were surprised at the entrepreneurial environment they stepped into.  While seeking information about LSAT tests, they were approached by a high official of LSAC/LSAS who started talking to them about prospective business ventures.  Robinson and Katzman wrote that “one of the principal executives of LSAC/LSAS introduced himself.  ….  Far from maintaining a bureaucratic reserve, he embraced us enthusiastically.  Not only did he promise the  support of LSAC/LSAS, he even proposed the possibility of various joint ventures.” [116]  The two Princeton Review writers did not respond to a request for an interview on the subject. [117]  


            A bizarre attempt by an ambitious pair to take over the LSAT organization was turned back in the mid-1980s, at the height of the Reagan Revolution when the capitalist marketplace was touted as the ideal medium to address all types of societal needs.  John R. Kramer, Tulane University law professor, 1996-97 Chairperson of the ABA Committee on Governmental Relations and Student Financial Aid, and 1994 addition to the ABA Section of Legal Education remembers the strange takeover bid.  In a 1994 deposition, Kramer recalled that he was serving on the LSAC Board when the unwelcome venture capitalists made their move.  “When I was on it, it was trying to stop a wild attempt to take over LSAC in a bid by Mr. Zimmer and…[Thomas O.] White.”  These two operatives, Kramer said, “smelled the ability to make a profit from the loan program, and made a tender offer…to the Board, which was composed primarily of deans…to take it over and take it away from the deans.”  This led, he explained, to “consternation” and “shouting matches.” [118]  




            “Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the end justifies the means.”  Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), The Prince.


Objection as to Form


            The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar controls ABA policies concerning law school accreditation and entrance to the profession.  The section is divided into (a) the Council and (b) the Accreditation Committee.  Section members elect members to the Council and the Chairperson of the Section appoints members to the Accreditation Committee. [119]   This latter Committee includes the Office of the Consultant on Legal Education, a position held since 1974 by James P. White. [120]   Despite the job title, it is a staff position that has wielded vast and centralized power.


            ABA officials regard the LSAT as the only test that meets their Standard 504, which requires law schools to use “an aptitude test,” though the ABA’s own officials conceded it is not an aptitude test. 


            ABA officials evidently thought their accreditors had an aptitude for evaluating activities at exotic spots around the globe.  The U.S. Department of Justice charged that the ABA conducted “increasingly frequent, and largely unnecessary inspections of foreign programs.” [121]   Many ABA accreditors were given free trips to countries throughout the world, purportedly to inspect summer programs of American law schools.  This practice was such an “abuse” that , when the antitrust case was filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, the ABA was forced to end the junkets, according to documents filed with the U.S. Department of Education.  Critics said the program of inspections of overseas sites had nothing to do with the quality of education in U.S. law schools. [122]   Professor Palm, who received one European trip in each of his seven years on the Accreditation Committee, said of the foreign travel, “I feel it was an earned ‘perk.’” [123]  


            LSAT fees paid by law school applicants have been used to benefit ABA officials, who have served simultaneously as LSAC officials.  The American Association of Law Schools, also involved in the accreditation process, has provided benefits to ABA officials as well.  Although AALS lacked the riches of LSAC, it rewarded ABA’s James P. White and others with fine food and hotel accommodations.  Millard Rudd, who was Executive Director of AALS (1973-80 and 1983-87), Chairman of LSAC (1966-69) and James White’s predecessor as ABA Consultant on Legal Education (1968-73), realled in a deposition:


            “The American Association of Law Schools never paid the way of the LSAC people….  They had money and we [AALS] didn’t have money.  They took pity on us, and so to some of their meetings they maybe even paid transportation. 


            “Now, with AALS we get so many free rooms for every 50 people…and we housed Jim White free….


            “We got an immense amount of work out of people without paying them a nickel.  We fed them reasonably well and housed them well.” [124]                


            In an interview for the 1997-98 LSAC fiftieth anniversary oral history, Rudd had recalled that LSAT executives saw a silver lining in the intense competition for admission to law schools in the 1970s:


            “There was interest overall in the law school world in the creation of additional schools.  How much encouragement should there be in that?  The LSAC had an interest in the question, the bigger the admission crunch, the more stress or weight there was on the process of making admissions decisions…and criteria and so on.” [125]  


            During the deposition, Rudd was asked to elaborate on what he told the oral historian:


            Question:  “Was that something that was discussed at the time?”


            Rudd:  “Yes, I think so, er – it must have been.  ….”


            Question:  “Well, the bigger the admission crunch, the more stress or weight gthere was on LSAT?”


Rudd:  “Sure.”


Question:  “And the more revenue to LSAT?”


Mr. Stewart:  “Objection as to form.” 


So apparently LSAC/LSAS, which had some of its officials serving simultaneously as ABA accreditation officials, had a financial interest in having new law schools denied accreditation. [126]              


Quasi-Judicial Function


            Forty-two jurisdictions in the United States require graduation from an ABA-accredited law school as a prerequisite to sitting for the bar examination.  Thus the ABA exercises a governmental type of power when it decides law school accreditation issues. [127]   Written policies of the ABA Section on Legal Education affirm that it serves a “vital quasi-judicial function in the legal system,” and “must…avoid even the appearance of impropriety.” [128]   But critics say the section, under White’s control, has had “serious conflicts of interest” – the full extent of which is unknowable because of the extreme secrecy of the White organization. [129]


            ABA Standard 503 says:  “All applicants, except those physically incapable of taking it, should be required to take an acceptable test for the purpose of determining apparent aptitude for law study.  A Law School that is not using the Law School Admission Test sponsored by the Law School Admission Council should establish that it is using an acceptable test.”  According to a recent LSAC president, this means that a law school must use a test that employs grading and statistical techniques similar to those of the LSAT. [130]   Of 177 law schools accredited by the ABA, all 177 require the LSAT; the ABA never has accredited a law school that tried an alternative to the LSAT. [131]   The ABA Section of Legal Education allegedly has made false representations to the U.S. Department of Education that ABA does not require law schools to require applicants to take the LSAT. [132]      


            The report of the 1989 ABA Conference on Validity and Reliability provided this very succinct so-called “analysis” of Standard 503:  “This is a standard for quality-determination, and is derived from Objective C27.” [133]   Objective C27 says: “To determine that the law school has admissions policies and procedures designed to admit students who have demonstrated the potential for the successful study of the law.” [134]   The stated purpose of the conference was to determine whether each ABA accreditation standard was “really a standard for quality determination;” the report represented what the conference participants, meeting at Indianapolis, “believe to be the…objectives of ABA accreditation.” [135]   However, the “analysis” in the Indianapolis report not only lacks substance but also fails the test of logic.  It says Standard 503 is “derived from” Objective C27.  But, in fact, Objective C27 was divined by the 1989 conference participants themselves, many years after Standard 503 had been put into effect.  C27 represents the conferees’ attempt to derive the meaning they wanted, to rationalize an old standard that had come under attack. 


            Long-time ABA official Henry Ramsey, Jr. has argued that “ABA standards do not require that a school make its admissions decisions based on the basis of whether you…do well…or do poorly on the LSAT.” [136]    He told the Indianapolis conference, “We can show you schools that have admitted people with a 10,” and “you get a 10 if you sign your name;” he explained, “What we say is…that a school ought to require an applicant to take the LSAT or…some other objective test, so…there is some common standard tghat schools are applying….  The weight to be assigned to the LSAT…is totally within the discretion of the school.” [137]   But Ramsey’s argument encounters a problem of logic; after all, if the weighting is inconsistent, the standard is not common at all.


            ABA Standard 501 requires a law school to maintain an educational program to prepare graduates for admission to the bar.  But the official interpretation of ABA Standard 301 prohibits a law school from offering a bar review course for credit.  Standard 302 also prohibits a bar review course for credit, and adds that such a course may not be required for graduation.  The effect of these prohibitions is to force practically all who want to take the bar exam to pay for expensive, for-profit bar review courses [138] typically costing about $2,500.  The ABA accreditation standards that forbid law schools to require or offer credit for a bar review course are a boon to the for-profit bar review courses that virtually all law school graduates consequently enroll in.


            Massachusetts School of Law charged that members of the ABA Section of Legal Education intentionally have gotten personal benefits economically, in their work lives and in terms of prestige from their anticompetitive standards of accreditation.  These benefits allegedly have included increased law school salaries, high-paying jobs as consultants to law schools seeking accreditation, and deanships, as well as opportunities to profit from bar exam preparatory courses. [139]   Sometimes the visibility and prestige of a high-level committee chairmanship may lead to job offers or business opportunities.


            The ABA prohibits law schools from offering bar exam preparatory courses, either for credit or as a condition for graduation – even for students whom the school has identified as being at risk of not passing the bar exam. [140]   The ABA ban on required or credit-bearing courses that could help students prepare for the bar exam is, like some other ABA criteria, not related to the quality of legal education. [141]   And yet individuals involved financially with commercial bar review courses, which benefit from the ABA anticompetitive criterion, have been actively involved in the ABA Accreditation Committee itself, enforcing the standards from which they personally profit. [142]


A Bundle of Money


Dean Peter A. Winograd (J.D., Brown University; LL.M., Harvard University) of the University of New Mexico University Law School has been involved with the LSAT organization since the days when it was part of the Educational Testing Service.  In the late 1970s he was in charge of law school matters for the ETS, which already was reaping millions of dollars from the LSAT. [143]   Winograd has been an enforcer of ABA standards that make law schools require applicants to take the LSAT and prohibit law schools from offering required or for-credit bar review courses.  At the same time, Winograd has beenb a promoter of a for-profit bar review course in which his friend, Frederick Hart, had a financial interest.  Winograd has been a top official of the organization that sponsors and conducts the LSAT.  On the LSAC Board of Trustees for 15 years and its president from 1989 to 1991, Winograd also served as an accreditor on 22 law school review teams and chaired nine of them – and was a member of the ABA Standards Review Committee. [144]  


Winograd was reached by telephone at his office on the campus on the banks of the Rio Grande.  He was asked about the alleged conflict of interest of those who have been involved with ABA accreditation, LSAT administration and for-profit bar review ventures at the same time.  “Me!” he interrupted before the question was even completed.  “I’m one of those,” he answered.  “I don’t think it’s a conflict.” [145]   He volunteered:  “I was never in the position of making a decision with regard to Massachusetts School of Law.  [The author had not asked him about that or any other particular law school.]  I was on the team that visited them and I wrote…an accreditation report.  The report itself provides the Accreditation Committee with the facts….  The fact that you do have leaders who do cross over these organizations, uh, and, uh, they have recused themselves when appropriate.  I really don’t think there have been conflicts there.  I mean, you know, different people see the world in different ways….” [146]   According to his thinking, he would have faced an ethical conflict if he voted on the matter, but not if he merely wrote the report relied on by those who voted.  How can an experienced attorney and legal educator fail to see the carryover of the conceded ethical conflict? 

When Massachusetts School of Law sued the ABA, it said one Walter McLaughlin warned of adverse accreditation consequences if the law school did not use bar review materials sold by SMH, the business that Winograd’s close friend and associate, Frederick Hart, co-owned with McLaughlin. [147]   But McLaughlin accused Massachusetts School of Law of  “unethical” conduct because it shared with students an old set of SMH bar review materials that he himself had donated to the law school’s librfary.  He complained that the law school let students see outdated videos and did not pay.  McLaughlin vowed to solicit Massachusetts School of Law students who he said “need the services of SMH, the oldest and largest coursed preparing students for the Massachusetts bar exam.” [148]   In an affidavit, Winograd said he never recived any compensation for his services to LSAC and LSAS. [149]   ABA perks received by Winograd, a leading ABA accreditor for decades, included a trip to Hong Kong in July 1955 – after the consent decree condemning such free trips was issued in United States v. American Bar Association. [150]  


Professor Frederick M. Hart of the University of New Mexico Law School (J.D., Georgetown University; LL.M., New York University) has given every appearance of being an upstanding educator, lawyer and entrepreneur.  Hart had played an instrumental role in bringing his friend, Winograd, to the law school in mile-high Albuquerque where they work together. [151]   Hart has served as an ABA accreditation official rfesponsible for requiring law schools to force applicants to take the LSAT, and forbidding law schools from requiring or giving credit for bar exam preparatory courses; he also served as a senior official of the organization that sponsors and conducts the LSAT, while he was pursuing an economic interest as co-owner of a for-profit bar exam preparatory course.


When Massachusetts School of Law, paving the way for the Department of Justice antitrust action, filed suit against the ABA, Hart was co-owner of the SMH law review course, and had until a short time before been a member of the ABA Accreditation Committee.  He had been president of LSAC/LSAS from 1974 to 1976. [152]   Hart, who continued for decades serving on LSAS committees, [153] said that SMH has closed up shop, unable to compete with larger bar review courses such as West BarPassers, which he has lectured for, [154] and BarBri.  He was said to have made “a bundle of money” from the SMH bar review course. [155]   Hart reputedly received a “major economic benefit” because ABA accreditation standards eliminated law school courses that would have competed with his profitable SMH bar review course. [156]   Co-owner of a major for-profit bar review for two decades, Hart resigned from the ABA Accreditation Committee in 1993 when, according to Massachusetts School of Law officials, he was “very concerned” about the fact that their law school was unwilling to “tolerate this conflict quietly.” [157]


Hart, in an interview, has acknowledged not only the limitations of the LSAT but also the limited value of bar preparatory courses such as the one in which he held an interest.  He said, “Well, frankly, I’ve been involved in bar review for years….  I’ve always thought that, if somebody had the ability to sit down and organize their time for six weeks, they could do it without a bar review course….  The major part of a bar review course is putting somebody on a schedule and keeping to it.  If you’re paying a lot of money, you tend to go and keep up with it.” [158]  


In recent years Winograd and Hart have devoted themselves to their students, at UNM, a school proud of its programs in American Indian law, environmental, wildlife and health law and ethics – in the dry, thin air of spectacular horizons, where indigenous people 25,000 years ago fashioned stone spearheads.  Temple University President Peter Liacouras recalled Hart as “:always an enterprising person,” and “a big mover and shaker” in ABA and LSAC circles. [159]   Liacouras conceded, when questioned, that he and his colleagues at Temple tried unsuccessfully to start their own bar review course for profit.  “Because of that rule, my idea was to have a summer session, have our professors make all the money.  ….  Look, why are we going to let these people make all the money?  We’ll have our own bar review course….  [But] it was an idea 20 years too late…[because] the national groups came in.” [160] Really Can’t Comment    Henry Ramsey, Jr., retired Alameda County, Calif. Superior Court judge and former dean at Howard, is a prominent example of a person who worked both sides.  He was an official of the LSAT sponsoring organization as well as an ABA section that required law schools to use the LSAT.  He had been a 1970s Berkeley law professor and Berkeley City Councilmember.  Ramsey has served on the ABA Section of Legal Education since 1982, chairing the section in 1991-92, and was simultaneously chairman of bar passage study groups from 1990 to 1993. [161]   He was listed as secretary for the section in 1996-97. [162]   He did not respond to requests for interview regarding the LSAT. [163]                         


At a U.S. Department of Education advisory committee meeting in Arlington, Va., Dean Velvel of Massachusetts School of Law noted that the ABA Section of Legal Education, and LSAC/LSAS and the AALS all work “hand in glove.” [164]   Judge Ramsey replied, “Nothing could be further from the truth.  ….  We have different roles…different constituencies.” [165]


Millard Raud, another two-hat man, was LSAC Chairman from 1966 to 1969 and became the powerful ABA Consultant on Legal Education in 1968.  He served on the ABA Standards Review Committee from 1990 to 1996. [166]


John Kramer, dean of Tulane Law School, chaired an ABA accreditation site team almost every year from 1980 on, was named to the ABA Council of the Section of Legal Education in 1994, and served on the LSAC Board and on a half dozen LSAC committees. [167]      


Frank Kurt Walwer, dean of Texas Wesleyan University Law School, was president of LSAC in 1983-84, during two of his many years of service as a member of the ABA Accreditation Committee (1976-94); he also served on the ABA Standards Review Committee (1986-94), and chaired the ABA Section of Legal Education (1986-87) and the AALS Section on Economics of Legal Education (1974-76). [168]  


Dean Jeffrey E. Lewis, of the University of Florida College of Law, served on the AALS Accreditation Committee (1984-86) and ABA site accreditation panels, and was a member of the LSAS and LSAC boards (1988-89), and the LSAC Finance and Legal Affairs Committee (1988-90), and chaired the ABA Committee on Foreign Law Study. [169]            

Rennard Strickland for more than 25 years has been regarded as one of the major leaders of ABA accreditors, LSAC test promoters and the AALS guild. [170]


Professor Gordon Duane Schaber of McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, also has served as both an enforcer of the ABA standard requiring LSAT usage and an official of the LSAT organization.  He served on the Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education for more than 20 years, chaired it in 1981, and became its secretary emeritus.  He also served on LSAC committees in the late 1980s. [171]   Temple’s President Liacouras described Schaber as “a big shot in the ABA,” who was “able to use the ABA very effectively – to promote his school.  He was an association politician,” a “mover and shaker.” [172]   Schaber said through an aide that he no longer granted interviews because of his health. [173]      


Claude Sowle, professor and former dean at University of Miami School of Law, and chairman of the ABA Accreditation Committee in 1966, died of a heart attack in March 1997.  He did more ABA accreditation work than any other living person prior to his untimely death.  He also was active for many years in the LSAT organization, and served as interim president of LSAS and interim executive director of LSAC in 1990-91.  Beginning in 1988 he devoted about half his professional time to his work for ABA and LSAC. [174]


When Lizabeth A. Moody, chairperson of an LSAS Board of Trustees committee, was asked in 1997 to comment on alleged conflicts of interest of those who work simultaneously as ABA accreditors and LSAS officials, she replied, “That’s something I really can’t comment on.  I am a member of the ABA Accreditation Committee.” [175]   The ABA listed her as 1996-97 Vice Chairperson of the Accreditation Committee. [176]   She also is a former Ohio Commissioner of Ethics. [177]                     

                                                                                                                         Beyond Intrusion      


An ABA committee report conceded that the ban on for-credit bar review courses and some other ABA-imposed standards were not justified principles of accreditation. [178]   Many leading ABA law school deans also recognize that ABA accreditation standards are oriented to something other than the quality of legal education.  The deans of 14 law schools, including Harvard, the University of Texas, Boston University and Stanford sent an open letter to all ABA law school deans on April 28, 1994. [179]   On Boston University School of Law stationery, the letter called for reform of the ABA accreditation process.  It charged that the “current process is excessively concerned with inputs that are not directly related to educational quality.” [180]  


The group of 14 who signed the extraordinary letter has grown to perhaps 100 deans concerned about the ABA’s accreditation standards and process, according to Joyce Jones of the U.S. Department of Education’s Accreditations and Eligibility Determination Division (AEDD). [181]   The deans view ABA’s “extreme” controls as a “straightjacket,” said Dr. Richard Rosser, a member of the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity. [182]   Other members of the U.S. Department of Education panel have called ABA standards “extremely intrusive…beyond intrusion into micro-management,” [183] and lacking any “apparent” relationship to “educational outcomes.” [184]         


ABA standards “clearly micromanage law schools in areas that are totally unrelated to the quality of legal education,” said Scott Bice, an invited participant at a National Advisory Committee session. [185]   “I agree with what Scott Bice said gthat the standxards are micromanagement,” commented Russell Osgood, Dean of Cornell University Law School and one of the Group of Fourteen. [186]   “So,” Bice said, “it’s a bar association that is ultimately setting these accreditation standards and, as has been pointed out, there is an inherent conflict of interest built into it.” [187]     


Dean Howard Glickman of Touro College Law Center, Huntington, N.Y., said accreditation standards of ABA, like a Middle Ages guild, impose “unnecessary costs” on legal education. [188]  Chicago’s Gary Palm sees ABA regulation of accreditation standards as being too weak.  Palm, maverick member of the ABA Council of Legal Education, said “the ABA has been a ‘paper tiger’ and has not sufficiently pushed to improve legal education to train our students to be prepared to practice.” [189]   The Palm view can be reconciled with that of other critics.  ABA overmanages by imposing arbitrary mandates that have nothing to do with the quality of legal education (e.g., students’ work hours, for-credit bar review courses and the LSAT), but undermanages areas that do relate to educational quality (notably, curricula to prepare lawyers to defend the rights of less advantaged members of society who need representation).


ABA accreditation standards were written by “people who have relatively little experience outside of legal education,” according to Howard B. Eisenberg, Dean of the School of Law of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. [190]   “Moreover,” he said, “their experience…has been restricted almost entirely to one specific type of law school, which has one particular kind of curriculum, and serves one particular kind of student.” [191]       


When U.S. Secretary of Education William J. Bennett in 1998 renewed the ABA Council’s status as a federally recognized accrediting agency, he asked the Council to submit within nine months a report on its “compliance with criterion (b)(4) (ethical practices).”  At the same time, he requested that the Council submit a report in 1989 on “compliance with criteria (a)(1)(ii) (definition of scope) and (b)(5) (program of assessment of validity and reliability of accreditation standards).” [192]   When Secretary Alexander Lamar, citing 20 U.S.C. s 1145, renewed in 1992 the ABA Council’s status as a recognizer accrediting agency, he instructed the Council to submit within a year a report showing “strengthened compliance” with 34 C.F.R. s 602.16(i).  That provision calls for “a systematic program of review…to assess the validity and reliability of the agency’s criteria, procedures, and standards.” [193]   Secretaries Bennett and Alexander did not explicitly confront the problem, the conflict of interest where ABA officials enforce questionable standards that appear to advance ABA officials’ own self-interest.


The Code of Federal Regulations calls for an accrediting agency to utilize “any criteria established by the agency with respect to nationally recognized, standardized…tests designed to measure the aptitude of prospective students to compete successfully in the program to which they have applied.” [194]   The U.S. Department of Education staff analysis in 1992 made the conclusory assertion that this requirement was met by the ABA standard that says law schools must either use the LSAT or show they are “using an acceptable test.” [195]   The departmental staff did not take note that the ABA never has found any test otgher than the LSAT to be acceptable.  It did not take note that the LSAT is concededly not an aptitude test.  It did not take note that the LSAT is a goldmine.              


Federal regulation requires an accrediting agency to maintain “effective controls against conflicts of interest.” [196]   The 1992 U.S. Department of Education staff analysis of ABA compliance with that requirement was satisfied to note that the ABA Council had issued a statement 15 years earlier, in 1977, that proclaimed “impartiality and propriety,” and gratuitously to state that the Accreditation Committee and the Council disqualify members who have some bias or conflict of interest. [197]   The federal staff members apparently did not investigate to find out what was going on.

                                                                                                                                VII .  ANTITRUST ISSUES


“Through tatter’d clothes small vices do appear;

Robes and furr’d gowns hide all.  Plate sin with gold,

And gthe strong lance of justice hurtles breaks;

Arm it in rags, a pigmy’s straw does pierce it.”

            William Shakespeare, King Lear IV, vi, 69 (1606)


                                                                                                                       Combination and Conspiracy


The U.S. Department of Justice on June 27, 1995 charged:  “Beginning at least as early as 1973 and continuing until the date of this Complaint, the ABA and its conspirators have engaged in a continuing combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” [198]   In effect, the government took over the prosecution of various civil charges that had been initiated by Massachusetts School of Law.  The move by DOJ brought of the federal government to bear against the alleged conspirators, and substantially racheted up the order of battle.  It was no longer a contest between the world’s most powerful professional organization and a small New England law school.  It was a war of wills between that association and the world’s most powerful law enforcement agency. 


Some observers lament that the consent decree signed in United States v. American Bar Association did not demand sufficient reforms, and failed to address specifically the issue of the mandatory LSAT.  Andy Portinga wrote in the University of Michigan Journal of Legal Reform: 


Although not addressed in the consent decree a…conflict of interest

exists between the ABA and the Law School Admission Council (LSAC)….


although use of a standardized admission test, in and of itself, does

not violate the Sherman Act, the placement of some directors

of the LSAC on the ABA accreditation committee and site

inspection teams may raise an antitrust problem.  Given that the

LSAC collects over forty million dollars from administering the

LSAT and has posted profits as high as fourteen million dollars

[about a 35 percent rate of profit], the LSAC clearly has an interest

in maintaining the LSAT monopoly and preventing an alternative

test from being used.  ….


In order to prevent the misuse of ABA accreditatioin by commercial

enterprises, the ABA should prohibit persons who have a substantial

financial stake in either the LSAC or a commercial bar review

course from participating in the creation or enforcement of

accreditation standards. [199]

                                                                                                                                 In the Public Interest    


The Department of Justice answered public critics by arguing that a consent decree does not have to provide the best remedies possible, provided that it is at least within the scope of the public interest.  The Departrment pointed out that the court must determine if the proposed consent decree would be “in the public interest” according to the Tunney Act. [200]   “:Under this standard, ‘the court’s function is not to determine whether the resulting array…is one that will best serve society, but only to confirm gthat the resulting settlement is within the reaches of the public interest.” [201]


The non-profit ABA has argued that it is exempt from federal antitrust laws. [202]   But the Sherman Act applies to non-profit organizations as well as commercial enterprises. [203]   And the ABA has been accused of imposing an anticompetitive “cartel” in te field of legal education. [204]   Antitrust expert Richard M. Calkins, former dean of Drake University Law School, has said the ABA appears to be in a monopoly position because it controls the qualifications requisite to taking the bar examination in the vast majority of states. [205]   In most states, the ABA, in combination with its accredited schools, allegedly has curbed competition by withholding accreditation or threatening disaccreditation. [206]   The most notable exception is California, where a strong State Bar has its own law school accreditation process.

                                                                                                                            Cloak and Dagger


The ABA has abused its monopoly power by actively conspiring to “freeze out” from law school people of lower socioeconomic status and the middle-aged, according to the complaint filed in Massachusetts School of Law v. American Bar Association.  The ABA has generally monopolized control over law school accreditation and consequently licensing of lawyers in the United States.  It is alleged to have abused this power by imposing anticompetitive standards to which law schools have to adhere if they are to be accredited by the ABA, so that their graduates will be able to sit for the bar exam. [207]   Named as the alleged leader of the conspiracy was James P. White, the long-time leader of ABA accreditation. [208]        


James Patrick White, born in 1931 in the depths of the Depression, was a native son at the University of Iowa where he received B.A. and J.D. degrees in the 1950s, going on to earn an LL.M. at the George Washington University.  He was on the faculty of the University of North Dakota Law School for eight years.  He taught at Indiana University School of Law in Indianapolis beginning in 1967. [209]   For years White has run the day-to-day operations of the ABA Accreditation Committee. [210]   Critics of his Committee include the Council on Post Secondary Education.  White’s style has reflected or contributed to the “cloak and dagger” atmosphere said to surround most of the work of the Accreditation Committee, according to some critics. [211]   Said one, “the CIA ought to wish it were as secret as the ABA.” [212]   White and colleagues in the Section on Legal Education allegedly made misrepresentations to the U.S. Department of Education to the effect that there is no connection between the ABA and LSAC/LSAS. [213]   In an affidavit provided to the U.S. Department of Education, White said his “Council is totally a separate and distinct organization from the LSAS and LSAC.” [214]   The ABA and LSAC jointly have sponsored recruiting conferences; White regularly has met with the head of LSAC; and LSAC officials have significantly participated in the ABA accreditation process. [215]  


A professional accreditation organization such as ABA may be “subject to condemnation” under the Sherman Antitrust Act if its concerted action unreasonably restrains trade, under a “per se rule of reason” analysis. [216]   Acording to the Massachusetts School of Law complaint, the ABA, LSAC/LSAS, AALS and various named individuals engaged in “combinations, conspiracies and agreements,” and organized and enforced a “group boycott” in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. s 1, 2. [217]   They have, for example, endeavored to “boycott” law schools accredited by The State Bar of California.  According to a preliminary expert opinion by Richard M. Calkins, the ABA is in a monopoly position in the area of law school accreditation and has “illegally” asserted its monopolistic position in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. [218]

                                                                                                                      Slingshot-Armed Warrior


ABA (the old exclusivist guild), LSAC/LSAS (“run by” law professors) and AALS (a “trade union” for law professors) long have been regarded as the Big Thfree in legal education ruling circles. [219]   The LSAT sponsors, LSAC and LSAS, became extremely active in ABA accreditation activities. [220]   There has been a presumption that what is good for one is good for the others.  The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed the complaint and consent judgment June 27, 1995 in the ABA matter. [221]   The federal complaint alleged that the ABA had engaged in wide-ranging anticompetitive activities in violation of the Sherman Act.  The government charged gthat ABA engaged in a conspiracy which, as Dean Lawrence R. Velvel has said, was identical in most respects to the conspiracy charged in Massachusetts School of Law v. American Bar Association. [222]      


The Department of Justice complaint, like the earlier complaint b y the Massachusetts law school, alleged undue secrecy, misuse of process, improper prohibition of law school bar review courses, and other activities aimed at stifling competition.  Although the charges were scaled back in the federal complaint compared to the earlier litigation, ABA turned over 544,000 pages of documents to the DOJ, whereas it had produced fewer than 50,000 pages in response to discovery requests pursuant to the  somewhat broader complaint by the Massachusetts law school. [223]  


ABA officials consented to the Final Judgment for Equitable Relief filed by DOJ in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. [224]   The 1995 judgment ordered the ABA to set up a Special Commission to Review the Substance and Process of the ABA’s Accreditation of Law Schools, to determine whether standards, interpretations and rules should be revised regarding treatment of bar preparation courses and other matters. [225]   Further, the final judgment enjoined the ABA from using accreditation standards to influence law school pay scales.  It enjoined ABA from telling its law schools that they may not offer transfer credits or post-J.D. (such as LL.M.) program enrollment to graduates of state-accredited law schools.  It enjoined ABA from telling its law schools they may not operate for profit.  It ordered ABA to allow public comment on its rules.  And it called for changes in the membership of the ABA Council of the Section of Legal Education, The Accreditation Committee and the Standards Committee.  The final judgment also ordered the ABA to name an Antitrust Compliance Officer, and to provide all pertinent information to DOJ until 2005.  In the meantime, the final judgment provides that the Attorney General may send federal agents to access ABA offices and records and interview ABA employees. [226]


A disheartened Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa of the New York Court of Appeals resigned as Chairman of the Council of the Section of Legal Education and quit the ABA to protest the settlement of the Justice Department suit.  In his farewell column in the Section newsletter, he wrote:  “Sadly, no courageous, slingshot-armed warrior emerged from hallowed tradition to at least challenge, if not slay, a visionless Goliath, Big Government.” [227]   The newsletter of the ABA Section of Legal Education reported in its Fall 1996 issue that the ABA was granted summary judgment in te antitrust action that Massachusetts School of Law had filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1993. [228]   The article did not mention that the Massachusetts law school’s suit had inspired an antitrust suit by the U.S. Department of Justice (in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia), which extracted a consent decree subjected ABA to a 10-year program of federal enforcement and supervision now in progress.


Professor John S. Elton of Northwestern University School of Law criticized gthe judgment as too weak.  He said he based his assessment on his graduate training in education, 23 years experience teaching law, and service on the ABA Accreditation Committee and 15 ABA or AALS site inspection teams.  Elton said the proposed “plan for reforming law school accreditation leaves the ABA free to establish an accreditation process that has little regard for law schools’ duty to prepare students for their professional roles. [229]                

                                                                                                                               Trying to Burn Down a School


Gary Pal, Clinical Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, and a dissident but popular member of the ABA Section of Legal Education, said the consent decree in the federal case failed to provide for “dramatically different and better legal education so the lawyers of the future can redeem the reputation of the profession by providing better representation to their clients and improving our system of justice.” [230]   Palm asked the Justice Department to strengthen the consent decree by asserting true outside regulation of accreditation apart from academic faculty and deans. [231]  


Dean Velvel of Massachusetts School of Law has been a driving force who has inspired the investigations of ABA anticompetitive practices. [232]   His law school filed the important antitrust action that called public attention to conspiratorial practices of the ABA, such as the LSAT mandate that enriches special interests while disenfranchising many deserving students.  His actions paved the way for the antitrust complaint by the U.S. Department of Justice, in the end, placing the ABA Council of Legal Education under a 10-year enforcement program under federal supervision.  Dean Velvel brings a colorful history to his school.  As he told the story during a 1992 session of the National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Integrity:  “Our law school started when…it was found out that the president of another law school in Massachusetts was literally a criminal.  He fired me as the Dean and fifteen of the students left.  He is now under indictment for both extortion in Florida and arson in Massachusetts for trfying to burn down our school.”  At the other school, the late White House hopeful, U.S. Senator Paul Tsongas [D-Mass.] had unwittingly gotten on its board, not knowing its history.  In due time, Senator Tsongas left the board and the accused criminal’s school dissolved. [233]                           


Even LSAT officials no longer can deny that law schools have erred in allowing test scores to drive admissions.  “Essentially, what some law schools do is place too much emphasis on the LSAT score and numbers alone, rather than looking at the whole student,” conceded Ed Haggerty, an LSAT spokesperson. [234]


University of Pennsylvania Law School Dean Colin S. Diver, calling for an end to the LSAT mandate, told the Special Commission to Review the Substance and Process that “[m]onopoly is inherently dangerous and therefore inherently suspect.  I believe the ABA has itself often expressed this view in various contexts.  Yet, the ABA is itself a virtual monopolist in the legal education marketplace.” [235]    




Lani Guinier said of the LSAT, “Perhaps we need to change the test, or maybe not use the test, because it is not telling us what it takes to be a good lawyer, a good law student, and most important, a good citizen of one’s community.” [236]   As Anthony Lewis has written, “Our county is going to become more diverse, not less.  Unless universities are allowed to look at the reality of students from bad ghetto schools and consider their capacity for growth – consider them as individuals – it is going to be an America even more divided, even more susceptible to racial discontent and demagoguery.” [237]


            Massachusetts School of Law uses a “holistic” admissions process. [238]   The school administers its own essay aptitude test.  The school interviews each applicant, reviews the academic performance record, and takes into account pertinent life experiences. [239]   The school is said to place emphasis on the applicant’s overall academic and non-academic record and personal interview.  The essay aptitude test, designed to reveal ability to give articulate expression to relevant facts in support of a position, thus is one of several factors the school considers in the admission process.  It does not consider LSAT scores. [240]   A typical Massachusetts School of Law Admission Test (MSLAT) consists of roughly a 700-word autobiography of a hypotghetical law school applicant, John Jones, followed by these instructions:


            Question 1    


            “Based on the above facts, write an essay giving all the reasons which militate in favor of admitting Jones to the Massachusetts School of Law.”


            Question 2


            “Based on the above facts, write an essay giving all the reasons which militate in favor of denying Jones’ application for admission to the Massachusetts School of Law.”


            The school’s typical essay exam comes with these instructions:


            “In answering the foregoing two questions, please be aware that every fact in the above fact pattern bears on whether John should be admitted to MSL or denied admission.  In ogther words, no fact is extraneous.


            “The test is untimed.  We would advise you to take pains with it rather than to hurry through it.  We are not interested in your speed.  We are interested in your thoughtfulness, your ability to understand and develop sound reasons pro and con, and your ability to write.” [241]


            Gary Palm, the populist on the ABA Council, when asked whether the LSAT requirement should be re-thought or made optional in light of the forced retreat of civil rights and the new spectre of lily-white law school classrooms, answered that “maybe we should try to have some experimental work done on a new…test…to analyze what makes a good lawyer…or try to get minority contractors…minority professionals to come up with their own test….”  Such an undertaking, he suggested, could be funded by the cash-rich LSAC. [242]


            In December 2000, LSAC pledged $10 million toward development of alternative ways of measuring law school applicants. [243]   The purpose of law school admissions reform should be to achieve fair and equal treatment for candidates, to enhance the quality of legal education and thereby to help restore the reputation of the legal profession.  Valuing diversity is sine qua non, if the profession is to be able to serve the America of the future in which (as in California today) every racial group is a minority.  The goal must be not to produce money-seeking automatons, but to accept women and men who care about the ethical duty to serve the client, their community, their country and humanity.


            Lawyers, more than anyone else, ought to be sensitive to actual, apparent or potential conflicts of interest.  The ABA, more than any other institution, should be expected to steer clear of any appearances of conflict of interest.  Lawyers who let themselves be beneficiaries or instruments of financial conflicts of interest, and who construct legal defenses of such conduct, are largely, if unwittingly, responsible for the destruction of the ethical reputation of the profession.


            Even when they are honest servants with good intentions, the consequences of their conflicted conduct becomes an important public concern.  Such conduct that gives rise to questions of integrity should be scrutinized from the viewpoint of the public interest.  The lawyer’s conduct, and the profitable relationships it facilitates, must be analyzed so that society may undertake appropriate legal reforms.


            The point of conflict-of-interest reform analysis here is not to pass judgment on those who have conducted themselves in accord with contemporary norms, but rather to suggest the need for new standards that will represent a step on the path of progress toward a more enlightened and just society.  New rules of legal ethics should be promulgated to bring an end to the conflicts of interest that appear to have characterized the relationship between ABA and the LSAT organization.  The federal departments of Justice and Education; the Legislatures of California and Texas; the judiciary; associations of lawyers and law schools, legal educators and law students of every race and background should demand an end to the LSAT scandal.


            Law schools should pursue Affirmative Action or similar policies to ensure equal opportunity in practice for students from all segments of society.  Law school admissions officers should evaluate the whole candidate.  They should read the application file, talk to the applicant, evaluate demonstrated abilities and aptitudes, and consider all the qualities that make a good lawyer.  The LSAT should be abolished.    































[1] Professor of law, John F. Kennedy University School of Law, Walnut Creek, Calif.  Member, The State Bar of California; the Bar of the United States District Court (Northern Calif.); American Bar Association; National Lawyers Guild; International Bar Association.  B.S.F.S., Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; M.S., Boston University School of Public Communication; J.D., John F. Kennedy University School of Law; LL.M. (summa cum laude), Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco.

    The author gratefully acknowledges Dean Michael M. Guarino, John F. Kennedy University School of Law, who supervised the author’s original research on which this paper is based; Dean Lawrence R. Velvel of Massachusetts School of Law, who generously shared many primary source materials relied on herein; and Professor Lani Guinier of the Harvard Law School, who provided inspiration and encouragement.     

[2] Peter J. Liacouras, Toward a Fair and Sensible Policy for Professional School Admission (1978), quoted in Sarah Hooke Lee, Report to the Court on the Initial Phase of the Conspiracy Charged Here: 1978 to 1993, II MSL L. Rev. 1, 122 (1995).

[3] Id.

[4] Ralph Nader & Allan Nairn, Startling Admissions: Why the LSAT Doesn’t Make the Grade, Student Lawyer (Mar. 1980), 54.

[5] Allan Nairn & Associates, The Rein of ETS: A Brief Summary of the Ralph Nader Report on the Educational Testing Service, Today’s Education (Apr.-May 1980), 58G-59G; see also Nader & Nairn, id. at 59, 52.

[6] Robert Stevens, Law School and Law Students, 59 Va. L. Rev. 551, 604 (1973).

[7] Lani Guinier, The Real Bias in Higher Education, The New York Times, June 24, 1997, at A19. 

[8] Id.

[9] Id. .

[10] Lani Guinier quoted in M.A. Stapleton, Law School Notes: Professor Mulls Repairs to Admissions Policies, Chi. Daily L. Bull., July. 25, 1997, at 3.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Interview with Gary Palm, San Francisco (Aug. 3, 1997).  Interview notes on file with author.

[14] Susan E. Brown & Eduardo Marenco, Jr., MALDEF Law School Admission Study, 15 (1980), quoted in Marvin C. Puguese et al., New Directions in Diversity: Charting Law School Admissions Policy in a Post-Affirmative Action Era 31 (May 19, 1997), report distributed at news conference, University of California, Berkeley, on file with author.

[15] Allan R. Turnbull, William S. McKee & L. Thomas Galloway, Law School Admissions Council study, quoted in Nader & Nairn, supra note 4 at 31.

[16] Complaint, Mass. School of Law v. American Bar Association (MSL v. ABA), E.D.Pa., reproduced in I MSL L Rev. 2, 5 (1994).

[17] Dannye Holley & Thomas Klevin, Minorities and the Legal Profession: Current Platitudes, Current Barriers, 12 T.Marshall L. Rev. 299, 309-310 (1987), cited by Puguese et al., supra note 14 at 31.

[18] Resp. No. 30 by LSAS and LSAC, defendants, to plaintiff’s first Rule 34 motion for prod. of docs., MSL v. ABA, supra note 16, reproduced in II MSL L. Rev. 1, 137 (1994).

[19] Mem. of Facts Demonstrating That for Decades the Council of the Section of Legal Education Has Failed to Meet the Regulations Governing Accrediting Agencies 88 (1997), submitted to U.S. Dept. of Education, copy on file with author. 

[20] Mass. School of Law, letter to U.S. Dept. of Education, published in I MSL L. Rev. 2, 81 (1994).

[21] Peter Winograd (comment while conducting a site visit at Mass. School of Law), cited in Response to MSL Report of ABA Inspection Team, III MSL L. Rev. I, 118-119 (1996).

[22] Telephone interview with Lizabeth A. Moody, Trustee, LSAS, Inc. (Aug. 13, 1997), notes on file with author.

[23] Id.

[24] Telephone interview with Jose Ramon Garcia-Pedrosa (Jul. 28, 1997), notes on file with author.  (Garcia-Pedrosa, the Miami Beach City Manager, returned the author’s phone call between world press interviews on his police department’s recovery of the body of alleged spree killer Andrew Cunanan).

[25] Telephone interview with Frederick M. Hart (Jul. 21, 1997), notes on file with author.

[26] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 66.

[27] Interview with Michael M. Guarino, Dean, John F. Kennedy Univ. School of Law (Aug. 15, 1997), notes on file with author.

[28] Telephone interview with Peter Winograd, Dean, Univ. of New Mexico School of Law (Aug. 13, 1997), notes on file with author.

[29] Id.

[30] Allan Nairn & Associates, supra note 5 at 58-G, 60-G.

[31] Id, at 61-G.

[32] Id. at 62-G.

[33] Id.

[34] II Am. Pre-Law Advisor 3, 5 (1990).

[35] LSAT Registration & Information Book 69 (1997).

[36] Deposition, Peter Liacouras, 29-32, quoted in Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 89.

[37] Letter from Colin S. Diver to Rosalie E. Wahl, J., Supreme Ct. of Minn. and chair, Commission to Review the Substance and Process of the ABA’s Accreditation of American Law Schools (Sept. 23, 1994); copy on file with author.  The Wahl Commission was established pursuant to a consent decree in United States v. American Bar Association (US v. ABA), D.D.C. (1995); see III MSL L. Rev. 1 (1996). 

[38] Interview with Bernard Ashe, San Francisco (Aug. 3, 1997), notes on file with author.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Laura S. Bennett, Executive Director, Fairtest, Cambridge, Mass., letter in The New York Times (May 17, 1997), at 16.

[42] Jose Ramon Garcia-Pedrosa, supra note 24.

[43] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19, at 39; see also Mass. School of Law letter, supra note 20. 

[44] Id. at 89.

[45] Id. at 65.

[46] 78 F.3d 932 (1996).

[47] Telephone interview with Peter Winograd, supra note 28.

[48] Telephone interview with Lizabeth Anne Moody, supra note 22.

[49] Lincoln, at Alton, Ill., Oct. 15, 1858, as reported in the Press & Tribune, reproduced in III The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 283, 315 (1953).

[50] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 60.

[51] Mem. In Support of Plaintiff’s Rule 37 Motion, MSL v. ABA, supra note 16 at 102.

[52] Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America, 65-66 (1976).

[53] Peter Liacouras, Toward a Fair and Sensible Policy for Professional School Admission, 165-166 (1978).

[54] Susan K. Boyd, The ABA’s First Section: Assuring a Qualified Bar 16 (1993).

[55] Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, at 184 n. 4 (1983).

[56] Jerold S. Auerbach, supra note 52 at 125.

[57] Peter Liacouras, in Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 61.

[58] Susan K. Boyd, supra note 54 at 17.

[59] Peter Liacouras, deposition, supra note 36 at 112-113.

[60] Id.

[61] Telephone interview with Peter Winograd, supra note 28.

[62] John Donne, Devotions XVII (1623).

[63] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 90.

[64] Id. at 62.

[65] Sarah Hooke Lee, Report to the Court on the Initial Phase of the Conspiracy Charged Here: 1978 to 1993, II MSL L. Rev. 1, 112 (1995).

[66] Robert F. Kennedy, The Pursuit of Justice (1963).

[67] UC Law Schools’ New Rules Cost Minorities Seats, Los Angeles Times (May 15, 1997) at 1.

[68] Blacks Opt Out of UC’s Boalt Hall This Year, Valley Times (Pleasanton, Calif., Jun. 27, 1997) at A9.  

[69] In Shift, U.S. Tells Texas to Obey Court in Barring Bias in College Admissions, The New York Times (Apr. 15, 1997) at A9.

[70] Lani Guinier, The Real Bias, supra note 7.

[71] Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Whiter Than White, The New York Times (May 23, 1997) at A19. 

[72] Jess Bravin, Law School Admission Council Aims to Quash Overreliance on LSAT, The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 29, 2001), at <> visited Sept. 15, 2001.

[73] Anthony Lewis, supra note 71.

[74] Ellis quoted in Peter Applebome, Affirmatiuve Action Ban Changes a Law School, The New York Times (Jul. 2, 1997) at A10.

[75] See Albert Y. Muratsuchi, Race, Class and UCLA School of Law Admissions, 1967-94, 16 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 90.               

[76] Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 NYU L. Rev. 1, 53 (Apr. 1997).

[77] Telephone interview with Frederick M. Hart, supra note 25.

[78] Id.

[79] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19.

[80] Jerome Karabel, The Effect of Color-Blind Admissions: The Case of California and Implications for the Nation, in Civil Rights Conference proceedings, Harvard University (Apr. 11, 1997), n. 16 at 13-14.

[81] Hopwood, supra note 46.

[82] Anthony Lewis, supra note 71.

[83] Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849 (1971).

[84] UC Regents Rescind Affirmative Action Ban, ACLU News (San Francisco, Jul.-Aug. 2001) at 2.

[85] Noah Grand, Demonstration Forces UC Regents Discussion of Race Preferences, Daily Bruin (UCLA) < > visited Sept. 15, 2001.

[86] 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627 (1967).

[87] Id.

[88] 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (1968).

[89] Id.

[90] Id.

[91] Interview with Bernard Ashe, supra note 38.

[92] Mike Royko, Boss: Richard K. Dailey of Chicago (1971).

[93] Complaint, US v. ABA, supra note 37 at 51.

[94] Andy Portinga, ABA Accreditation of Law Schools: An Antitrust Analysis, 29 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 664 (1996).

[95] Mem. in Support of Plaintiff’s Rule 37 Motion, supra note 51.

[96] Telephone interview with Lizabeth Anne Moody, supra note 22.

[97] Interview with Gary Palm, supra note 13.

[98] Mass. School of Law letter, supra note 20.

[99] Rick I. Morgan, ABA Data Specialist, memorandum to deans of ABA law schools (May 19, 1995), copy on file with author.

[100] United States v. American Bar Association (US v ABA), supra note 37.

[101] Plaintiff’s Resp. to Supplemental Public Comments, US v. ABA, supra note 37.

[102] Law School Admission Council, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation, and Amendment to Certificate of Incorporation, copy on file with author.

[103] New York Secretary of State letter to author (Jul. 28, 1997).

[104] Complaint, MSL v. ABA, supra  note 16.

[106] US v. ABA, supra note 37.

[107] ABA Section of Legal Education, Report of the Commission to Review the Substance and Process of the American Bar Association Accreditation of American Law Schools 20, 54 (Aug. 3, 1995).

[108] Dep., Robert Reinstein, in MSL v. ABA, E.D.Pa. (deposed Sept. 2, 1994), copy on file with author. 


[109] Dep., Kathlene Grove, in MSL v. ABA, E.D.Pa. (deposed Sept. 2, 1994), copy on file with author.

[110] Aff., James P. White, in MSL v. ABA, E.D.Pa. (Feb. 22, 1994), copy on file with author.

[111] George A. Pruitt, President, Thomas A. Edison State College, testimony before the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity 174-175, 177 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 22, 1996), on file with author.

[114] Scott Bice, vol. III Testimony Before the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity 194 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 22, 1996).

[115] Gary H. Palm, member, Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education, letter to U.S. Dept. of Justice (Oct. 2, 1995), copy on file with author.

[116] Adam Robinson and John Katzman, The Princeton Review: Cracking the System: The LSAT, 1st ed., Foreward (1989).

[117] The author’s request for interview was sent to Robinson and Katzman in a letter (June 16, 1997) care of their publisher, Random House. 

[118] Dep., John R. Kramer 11, 174-175 (Metaire, La., Aug. 10, 1994), in MSL v. ABA, E.D.Pa.

[119] Interview with Bernard Ashe, supra note 38.

[120] Complaint, MSL v. ABA, supra note 16.

[121] Complaint, US v. ABA, supra note 37.

[122] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 36-37.

[123] Gary H. Palm, letter to John F. Greaney, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Oct. 2, 1995), copy on file with author.

[124] Dep., Millard Rudd 178, in MSL v. ABA, supra note 16.

[125] Millard Rudd, interview for LSAS/LSAC Oral History Project Committee, quoted by questioner during Rudd’s deposition, id.

[127] Complaint, MSL v. ABA, supra note 16 at 82.

[128] Mass. School of Law letter to U.S. Dept. of Education, supra note 20.

[130] Weil, Gotshal & Manges of New York, Antitrust Opinion Letter, reproduced in I MSL L. Rev. 2, 34.

[131] Mass. School of Law letter to U.S. Dept. of Education, supra note 20 at 81.

[132] Id. at 77-78.

[133] Report of the Conferenc on Validity and Reliability 38 (Indianapolis, Feb. 24-25, 1989). 

[134] Id. at 12.

[135] Id. at 3-4.

[136] II Hearings of the National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility 134 (Arlington, VA., May 5, 1992).

[138] Weil, Gotshal, supra note 130.

[139] Complaint, MSL v. ABA, supra note 16 at 12-14.

[140] Complaint, note 37 at 54.

[141] Mass. School of Law letter to U.S. Dept. of Education, supra note 20 at 83.

[142] Weil, Gotshal, supra note 130.

[143] Mass. School of Law letter to U.S. Dept. of Education, supra note 20 at 83.

[144] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19.

[145] Telephone interview with Peter Winograd, supra note 47.

[147] Complaint, MSL v. ABA, supra note 16 at 13.

[148] Walter McLaughlin, letter to Lawrence R. Velvel (Apr. 27, 1992), copy on file with author.

[149] Aff., Peter Winograd (Feb. 21, 1994), in MSL v. ABA, supra note 16, copy on file with author.

[150] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 37.  

[151] Lawrence R. Velvel, letter to Frederick M. Hart (May 25, 1993), copy on file with author.

[152] Complaint, supra note 16 at 6.

[153] Law School Admission Services, Inc., Annual Report, (1955).

[154] Telephone interview with Hart, supra note 25.

[155] Telephone interview with Lawrence R. Velvel (June 18, 1997), notes on file with author.

[156] Mass. School of Law letter to U.S. Dept. of Education supra note 20 at 81.

[157] Id. at 83.

[158] Telephone interview with Hart, supra note 25.

[159] Dep., Liacouras, supra note 36.

[161] II Who’s Who in America 3407 (1996).

[162] American Bar Association, Directory: Section of Legal Education (1996-97).

[163] Answering machine messages were left for Ramsey at his East Bay, Calif. number on Jul. 17 and 21 and Aug. 13, 1997.

[164] II Hearings, U.S. Dept. of Education National Advisory Committee on Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility 132-133 (May 5, 1992).

[166] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 42.

[167] Id. at 42.

[168] 45.

[170] Id. at 25.

[171] Id. at 45.

[172] Dep., Liacouras, supra note 36.

[173] Telephone call to the author from McGeorge School of Law (Aug. 15, 1997), notes on file.

[174] I Dep., Claude Sowle 23-24 (Miami, Sept. 14, 1994).  See also Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 14.

[175] Telephone interview with Moody, supra note 22.

[176] ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Committee Directory (1996-97).

[177] II Who’s Who in America 2934 (1996).

[178] Standards Review Committee, ABA Section of Legal Education, Report to the U.S. Dept. of Education (1989), cited by Wiel, Gotshal, supra note 130.   

[179] The letter by the 14 law school deans reproduced in II MSL L. Rev. 2 at 48 ff.

[180] Id. at 49.

[181] III Hearings, National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity 131 (Nov. 22, 1996).

[182] Id. at 142.

[183] Alfredo G. de los Santos Jr., Vic Chancellor for Educational development, Maricopa Community Colleges, National Advisory Committee, supra note 181 at 147.

[184] David W. Adamany, President, Wayne State University, National Advisory Committee, supra note 181 at 160.

[185] Scott Bice, National Advisory Committee, supra note 181 at 188, 195-197.

[186] Russell Osgood, National Advisory Committee, id.

[187] Scott Bice, National Advisory Committee, id.

[188] Howard A. Glickman, letter to Hon. Rosalie E. Wahl (Sept. 27, 1994), coopy on file with author.

[189] Gary H. Palm, letter to U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 115.

[190] Howard B. Eisenberg, letter to Hon. Rosalie E. Wahl (Sept. 27, 1994), copy on file with author.

[192] Secretary William J. Bennett, letter to James P. White (Jan. 11, 1988), copy on file with author.

[193] Secretary Alexander Lamar, letter to James P. White (Aug. 18, 1992), copy on file with author.

[194] 34 C.F.R. s 602.13(k).

[195] U.S. Dept. of Education, Staff Analysis of the Petition Submitted by the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar of ABA for Renewal of Recognition 9 (May 4-6, 1992).

[196] 34 C.F.R. s 602.16(g).

[197] U.S. Dept. of Education, Staff Analysis, supra note 195.

[198] Complaint, Unitd States v. American Bar Association, D.D.C. (1996), supra note 37 at 55-56.

[199] Andy Portinga, supra note 94 at 664-665.

[200] 197 U.S.C. s 16(c).

[201] United States’ Resp. to Supplemental Public Comment, supra note 101 at 37, relying on language in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1460 (D.C. Cir.1995). 

[202] See Antitrust Opinion Letter of Weil, Gotshal, supra note at 37.

[203] Peter James Kolovos, Antitrust Law and Nonprofit Organizations: The Law School Accreditation Case, 71 NYU L. Rev. 689 (June 1966).

[204] Mem. in Support of Plaintiff’s Rule 37 Motion, supra note 51 at 98.

[205] Expert Opinion Letter by Richard M. Calkins, of Zarley, McKee, Thomte, Voorhees & Sease, of DesMoines and Omaha (Mar. 17, 1993), reproduced in I MSL L. Rev. 2 at 65.

[206] Id. at 66.

[207] Complaint, MSL v. ABA, supra note 16 at 4.

[208] Id. at 5.

[209] II Who’s Who in America 4443 (1996).

[210] Complaint, supra note 37 at 53.

[211] Thomas E. Brennan, The ABA Stifles Law Schools, Benchmark (published by Thomas Coioley Law School, Michigan), reprinted in I MSL L. Rev. 2 at 65.

[212] Lawrence R. Velvel, National Advisory Committee, supra note 181 at 213.

[213] Id. at 215.

[214] Aff., James P. White, supra note 110.

[215] Weil, Gotshal, supra note 130 at 45.

[216] Id. at 27.

[217] Complaint, supra note 16 at 10.

[218] Calkins, supra note 205 at 67.

[219] See Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 38.

[221] Complaint, United States v. American Bar Association, D.D.C., supra note 37.

[222] MSL v. ABA, supra note 16

[223] Lawrence R. Velvel, Introduction to ABA Antitrust Documents, III MSL L. Rev. 1 at 1-2.

[224] The text of the Final Judgment is reproduced at III MSL L. Rev. 1, 58 ff.

[227] Joseph W. Bellacosa, From the Chair, Syllabus 5 (Summer 1995).

[228] Syllabus 1, 19 (Fall 1996).

[229] John S. Elton, letter to U.S. Dept. of Justice (Oct. 2, 1995), copy on file with author.

[230] Gary H. Palm, letter to U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 115. 

[232] When the present author asked Dean Velvel for numerous specific documents among the tens of thousands of pages related to MSL v. ABA, fifteen pounds of documents soon arrived via express delivery. 

[233] Lawrence Velvel, National Advisory Committee, supra note111 at 99-100.

[234] John Polly, Law Schools to Reassess Use of LSAT Scores, Michigan Daily (U. of Mich., Apr. 3, 2001) < > visited Sept. 15, 2001.

[235] Colin Diver, National Advisory Committee, supra note 111 at 5.

[236] Lani Guinier, quoted by M.A. Stapleton, supra note 10.

[237] Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home, supra note 71.

[238] Mem. of Facts, supra note 19 at 23.

[239] Complaint, MSL v. ABA, supra note 16 at 7

[240] Report of the Visiting Committee to the Massachusetts School of Law (a letter, Feb. 18, 1992, by prominent New England attorneys and legal educators), reproduced in I MSL L. Rev. 2, 21; also, Dean Lawrence R. Velvel, letter to author (Sept. 18, 1997).  Copies on file with author. 

[241] Sample Massachusetts Law School Admission Test (MSLAT).

[242] Interview with Gary Palm, supra note 13. 

[243] Jess Bravin, supra note 72.

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